Abstract: Social identities are among the key factors driving social behavior in complex societies. Recent attention to social identity in consumer behavior indicates that individuals avoid products that might signal membership in an outgroup. Yet the population-level consequences of adoption as identity signaling are largely unknown. Whereas previous work has focused on asymmetric attraction and repulsion among groups with different social identities, here we consider the spread of innovations in a structured population in which there are multiple groups who don't want to be mistaken for one another, using both analytical and agent-based modeling. This formal analysis, the first to take the spatial structure of a population into account, allows us to consider empirically important factors, including demographic skew and communication scale, that likely influence overall patterns of adoption. We find that as products become emergent social markers, aversion to outgroup-associated products can decrease overall patterns of adoption and promote the extent to which uptake of a product is locally polarized. When communications are long-range, polarization can become global. This research has particular relevance to widely beneficial but identity-relevant products, such as green technologies, where overall levels of adoption determine the positive benefits that accrue to society at large.
Introduction
The adoption of new technologies can be influenced by identity signaling.
Consider, as an example, the adoption of hybrid cars. Owners of a Toyota Prius are willing to pay a few thousand dollars to signal their green intentions (Sexton and Sexton 2014) . On the other hand anti-environmentalists spend thousands of dollars to modify their vehicles' emissions systems to deliberately spew sooty diesel exhaust on electric cars, bicyclists and pedestrians (Weigel 2014) . In 2014, Cadillac and Ford capitalized on differences among proponents of hybrid cars, producing advertisements for their plug-in hybrids that appealed to contrasting values among car owners for products with similar functional qualities (Bradford 2014 ).
Identity signaling is important when multiple groups exist in a population and individuals benefit by being correctly identified with their group, as well as by not being mistaken for a member of another group. The anthropological literature has long characterized arbitrary social markers as critical for coordination when correlations exist between group identity and behavioral norms (Barth 1969; McElreath et al. 2003 , Wimmer 2013 . In complex societies such as ours, interactions delineated by social identities are ubiquitous (Smaldino in press) , and social markers are crucial coordination tools. Although social identities are multidimensional and context dependent (Roccas and Brewer, 2002; Ashmore et al. 2004) , in any particular context humans appear to have strong instincts to identify with a group, even if the distinguishing factor between ingroup and outgroup is arbitrary (Tajfel et al., 1971) .
In this paper, we examine product adoption as a form of social marking, and how the emergence of a product's role in identity signaling influences the diffusion of innovations. In particular, we investigate the effect of outgroup aversion on adoption, taking into account the spatial structure of a population and varying scales of communication across distances. We use an explicitly spatial model because the structure of interactions -precisely who interacts with whom -can be of critical importance in the temporal and categorical dynamics of social behavior (Durrett and Levin 1994; Newman 2003; Boccaletti et al. 2006) , including how innovations spread (Burt 1980; Abrahamson and Rosenkopf 1997; Watts & Dodds 2007; Delre et al. 2010) .
Although individuals often adopt a product for its intrinsic value, product adoption can also be used to distinguish oneself from other groups (Berger and Heath, 2008) . When adoption can be observed by others, products may become social markers and serve the role of helping individuals to find appropriate social partners for interactions (McElreath et al. 2003; Smaldino in press) . For this reason, an individual may be less likely to adopt a product if it is associated more with an outgroup than with their ingroup or with no group at all. Indeed, recent marketing studies suggest that the identity signaling component of product adoption comes into play even when the outgroup does not evoke negative affect, as long as it is seen as dissimilar. For example, in one study, Stanford undergraduates evaluated an mp3 player substantially less favorably after being told that it was popular with "business executives" (whom they rated as dissimilar but not disliked) compared with when they were told it was popular with "individuals" (Berger & Heath 2007, study 4) . In another study, after adopting a charity-affiliated bracelet, students from a "jock" dorm dis-adopted when the bracelet started appearing on the wrists of students from the nearby "nerdy" dorm, whom the jocks did not dislike but also did not want to be mistaken for (Berger & Heath 2008, study 2) . This latter study also serves to illustrate that products need not be intrinsically associated with particular social groups, but can emerge as social markers through preferential adoption by one group, for reasons that may be initially arbitrary.
The sociological literature has shown that even small differences in opinions, preferences, or product adoption can cascade, through the processes of homophily and social influence, into highly polarized social networks (Carley, 1991; Axelrod 1997; Mark, 1998; Flache and Macy, 2011) . A great deal of research has shown that the structure of those networks affects exactly how individuals influence, and are influenced by, one another (Burt 1980; Abrahamson and Rosenkopf 1997; Strogatz 2001; Watts and Dodds 2007; Funk et al. 2009; Delre et al. 2010; Flache and Macy 2011; Banerjee et al. 2013) . As a striking example, conformity across a broad spectrum of lifestyle preferences is seen within clusters of Americans identified only by political affiliation, such that arbitrary traits become markers of identity, as with "latte-drinking liberals" and "gun-toting republicans" (DellaPosta et al. 2015) . Although many factors lead to the adoption of behaviors or technologies, social influence through no other factor than network proximity can be such a powerful force that some have argued it must be explicitly discounted before other cultural or developmental explanations may be considered (Dow et al. 1982; McPherson 2004; DellaPosta et al. 2015) .
As a description of the emergence of an initially neutral product becoming strongly associated with a particular social identity, consider another example, this time from the beer industry. In the 1980s, Pabst Blue Ribbon (PBR) was a relatively unpopular beer in the United States, loosely associated with the white working class. Then, in the late 1990s, bars in Brooklyn and Lower Manhattan began offering PBR drink specials, attracted by its low price and relative obscurity. The brand gradually became associated with urban hipsters, spread to hipster enclaves in Portland and Los Angeles, and has since found widespread adoption in hip youth culture. Without any direct advertising, adoption as a social marker cascaded. Sold in 1985 for $63 million ($141 million in 2015 dollars), PBR was recently sold again in 2014 for an estimated $700 million (Gelles 2014) .
Meanwhile, its identity as a "hipster beer" may have turned at least some people away. As of this writing, the top definition for PBR on urbandictionary.com includes the remark, "Pabst Blue Ribbon is a lot like the band Bright Eyes. Hipsters love it, but everyone else thinks it's liquid shit."
A standard model of product adoption invokes status: a social marker describes a demarcation between social elites, who innovate in order to distinguish themselves, and the lower classes, who imitate the elites. This process of chase and flight drives new cycles of fashions as the elites continuously attempt to distance themselves from the lower classes (Simmel 1904 (Simmel /1957 . However, many cases of adoption or abandonment of products are not so easily characterized in terms of status. Indeed, innovations and fashions often originate from among the lower or middle classes (Berger & Heath 2008) .
Chase and flight dynamics are undoubtedly important in many settings, including some that don't involve groups with differing levels of socio-economic status (Bakshi et al. 2013 ). However, products are commonly used as social markers facilitating preferential interaction with ingroup members on the part of all groups. It is therefore important to examine diffusion dynamics for scenarios involving general tendencies for outgroup aversion, as suggested in an influential review by Peres et al. (2010) . Such an analysis has hitherto been missing from the literature on product adoption.
There are many important factors to consider in the dynamics of innovation adoption, and our aim here must not be to cover all of them with the veneer of identity signaling. In particular, we will not address multi-brand competition, in which companies selling similar products compete for customers. This type of competition has only recently been the subject of formal modeling, always with the assumption that customers are identical and brands equivalent (Libai et al. 2009; . Such competition entails rich dynamics, influenced by a host of factors such as the timing of product release, the network position of early adopters, and the strength of cross-brand influence (Libai et al. 2009; 2013) . Because the interplay between adoption and identity signaling has not been previously modeled, we believe it appropriate to limit our study here to the one-product, one-brand case so as to establish a baseline. Later in this paper, we will discuss multi-brand competition in light of our results.
We wish to consider how patterns of adoption are influenced by outgroup aversion, defined as a desire to not engage in activities associated with the outgroup; demographic organization, including network autocorrelation; and the scale of communication, contrasting local, short-range observations with long-range observations of distant actors. We also examine how these three factors influence patterns of local and global polarization, or the extent to which adoption is skewed towards one group or another. In the following sections, we present two models of innovation adoption as a social marker. The first is an analytical model that takes as its starting point the well-known model of Bass (1969) . This was the first model to provide a generative explanation of why many diffusion processes generate S-shaped adoption curves. Building on the work of Bakshi et al. (2013) , we extend this model to allow for two groups who are averse to products associated with the other group. Such a model is necessarily limited, however, because it assumes perfect population mixing and therefore cannot account for the influences of structural aspects of demography or communication. To investigate these influences, we introduce an agent-based model which we employ in Section 4 to address 
Analytical Model
We adopt the formalism from a recent paper by Bakshi et al. (2013) , who extended the model of Bass (1969) to account for product adoption by two interacting groups (Bakshi et al. refer to these as "segments" of the population). For each group, the probability of adoption is influenced by three factors: a background rate of spontaneous adoption, social influence from one's group members, and social influence from members of the outgroup. The model takes the form of coupled differential equations:
where for each group i, ai > 0, bi > 0, mi > 0, and 0 ≤ Ni ≤ mi. Ni is the current number of adopters at time t, out of a potential market of size mi. The remaining terms are the coefficient for innovation, ai, the coefficient for within-group imitation, bi, and the coefficient for cross-group imitation, ci. If both c terms are zero, the model reduces to two independent instantiations of the Bass (1969) model. Bakshi et al. (2013) took their inspiration from Simmel's (1904 Simmel's ( /1957 chase-and-flight theory, and restricted their analyses to cases where cross-group influence was positive for one group and negative for the other. Here, we are interested in the scenario where both groups want to avoid being associated with the opposite group, and so will reject or even disadopt products that are popular with the opposite group. We therefore focus on the case where c1 < 0 and c2 < 0.
A closed-form solution for this system of equations is not analytically tractable.
Moreover, we are heavily interested in demographic and communication effects related to population structure, so we forego a complete specification of the analytical model system 1 . However, some numerical analysis is quite revealing. Our primary interests are in the dynamics of adoption when products are social markers in the case of mutual repulsion, and not in the consequences of major between-group differences in within and between-group imitation or market size (though such consequences are surely worthy of future investigation). As such, we will focus on scenarios where the two groups are largely identical in their propensity for within-group imitation, cross-group imitation, and market size, so that b1
First, we consider what happens if outgroup aversion is weaker than ingroup imitation, such that |c| < |b|. If a1 = a2, then adoption will increase at the same rate in both groups, and since ingroup attraction outweighs outgroup repulsion, both groups will always achieve full adoption. If, however, the innovation rate is slightly higher in one group, then that group will adopt at an initially faster rate. This initial advantage can either lead to delayed adoption in the second group, or suppress adoption in the second group completely (Figure 1a and 1b). If outgroup aversion is stronger than ingroup attraction, |c| > |b|, an unstable equilibrium can occur in which both groups achieve equal levels of partial adoption. A perturbation to this equilibrium, however, can cause the system to gravitate to a stable equilibrium in which one group achieves complete adoption and the other group has zero adoption ( Figure 1c ). 
Agent-Based Model
The population in the model is structured into discrete patches upon which agents live and interact. Inter-patch interactions may also occur, representing long-distance effects such as travel, telephone, and social media. A product will be introduced which has some intrinsic appeal. Adoption is based on cumulative exposure, such that multiple exposures make it more likely that the innovation will be adopted, reflecting sociological research on complex contagion (Centola and Macy, 2007; Centola, 2010) as well as marketing research on network externalities, which can increase the utility of adoption as more people adopt (Peres et al. 2010) . If an individual's experience with the product, however, is heavily skewed such that its adoption is preferentially associated with the outgroup, the product will be less likely to be adopted. We will explore the effect of several parameters, including the importance of identity signaling, the extent of homophily in demographic organization, and the influence of long-range interactions.
More formally, the population is distributed across M patches, which are situated along a line so that each patch has two neighboring patches with the exception of patches 1 and M, which have only one neighbor 2 . We visualized this layout by placing the patches on a square grid, such that the rightmost patch in one row neighbors the leftmost patch in the row just below it ( Figure 2 ). Each patch contains N agents. Each agent has one of S social identities (S = {A, B}). To avoid majority/minority effects, we assumed equal overall numbers of individuals holding each identity, though we allowed the distribution of social identities to vary within each patch. Because similar individuals tend to assort (Dow et al. 1982; McPherson et al. 2001) , we generally assumed that, firstly, each patch would tend to be dominated by individuals with one social identity, and secondly, that the demographic skew of patches (i.e., the proportion of agents having a particular social identity) would tend to be spatially correlated---that the identity distribution within each patch more closely resembles the distribution in neighboring patches than in distant ones. 3 The algorithm for assigning agents to patches is given below. At time t = 0, an innovation is introduced into the population, which can be adopted. We assume that all agents share identical intrinsic valuation for the product and are equally capable of adopting it. In a single patch, n0 < N agents are chosen as "early adopters," who are initialized as already having adopted the innovation, and are randomly drawn from the same patch without heed to social identity. Note that we use the word "patch" to denote agents' spatial location. All uses of the word "group" refer to agents' social identity, not their location. Agents learn about the innovation through interactions with other agents. At each time step, each agent makes an observation with probability μ, the interaction rate. If an observation occurs, the focal agent observes a sample of m other agents. These observed agents are sampled one at a time. With probability f, an observed agent is sampled at random from the focal agent's own patch. Otherwise, the observed agent is drawn at random from an external patch. The parameter f allows us to continuously vary the clustering of the population, with a well-mixed population at one extreme and an isolated islands model at the other. We also experiment with the external patch being restricted to spatial neighbors (local external observation), or encompassing the entire population of patches (long-range external observation). Observations allow agents to become aware of innovations, and to make assessments of the innovation's prevalence among both in-and out-group individuals 4 . The order in which agents make observations is randomized at each time step. Once an agent has observed m other agents, she makes a decision about whether to adopt the innovation.
Social influence and innovation adoption
Following an observation, the agent decides whether or not to adopt the innovation. This decision is made even if the agent has previously adopted the innovation; in this case, a decision not to adopt implies a disadoption. Two factors contribute to the consideration of adoption: (1) a generalized frequency-dependent bias, whereby the more popular a product is in the population, the more likely an agent is to adopt it, and (2) an aversion bias, whereby agents prefer not to adopt an innovation adopted by outgroup members. By including a generalized frequency-dependent bias instead of restricting positive influence to one's ingroup, we are able to analyze the contrasting influences of positive frequency dependence and outgroup aversion in a more realistic manner than was possible in the analytical model.
First, consider the frequency dependent influence, F. An agent is more likely to adopt a more common product. We follow Granovetter (1978 in assuming that the likelihood of adoption is influenced by positive feedback -the more people do it, the more people will be willing to join in. This influence is probabilistic; for example, Berger and Heath (2007) found that, regardless of whether a product was identity relevant, some small proportion of people (at least 14% in their study 3) still chose a minority product over a more popular one. Nevertheless, their findings support the claim that, all things being equal, people tend to prefer more popular items, fitting the literature on positive biases in social transmission of ideas and behaviors (Bikhchandani et al. 1998) . In many cases, social forces can also lead to the preferential adoption of already popular items. For example, Salganik et al. (2006) used an artificial online music market to show that a product's adoption was largely determined by its early popularity, independent of inherent quality. Our assumption of positive frequency dependence is also congruent with research on complex contagion, which indicates that the adoption of social behavior often requires multiple sources of influence (Centola & Macy 2007) , as well as with research on network externalities, in which the utility of adoption increases as more consumers adopt the product (Peres 2010) . For example, the utility of purchasing a plug-in electric car increases as more people own them, because charging stations will become more prevalent and mechanics will be encouraged to gain expertise in their maintenance.
The positive frequency-dependent bias is tempered by the effects of outgroup aversion, the inverse of which is denoted by V. An agent is more likely to adopt an innovation that is more closely associated with individuals of the same social identity, and less likely to adopt an innovation that is closely linked to agents of another social identity. Berger and Heath (2007; our model is most relevant to products with low to moderate switching costs. We note, however, that even expensive items may have low switching costs. For example, in the U.S. it is not uncommon to purchase a new car every few years.
We assume that frequency dependence and outgroup aversion interact multiplicatively, so that the probability of adoption is given by
The frequency-dependent component is given by
where x is the proportion of observed agents who have adopted the innovation, and λ ∈ (0, 1) is a control parameter representing the strength of the frequency dependence. Many models of innovation diffusion formalize positive bias by a constant parameter times the number of adopters encountered, as we did in our analytical model. For our agent-based model, we wanted to be able to control the total number of agents observed, corresponding to an overall rate of contact, without changing the overall likelihood of adoption. Indeed, someone whose interactions are restricted to a small group of friends, all of whom have adopted, should be more likely to adopt than someone who has encountered many more people, only a fraction of whom have adopted. The parameter λ allows us to maintain this relationship between observations and adoptions and still vary the strength of the frequency dependence. When λ is closer to zero, the effect of direct social influence is small, so that innovations are likely to be adopted even at fairly low frequencies. When λ is closer to one, the probability of adoption scales linearly with the observed frequency of adopters 5 . Note also that this formulation conveniently combines socially influenced adoption and spontaneous innovation, which are separated in the Bass model, into a single term.
The influence of ingroup-outgroup bias is given by
where mI and mO are the number of observed agents who have adopted the innovation and are either in the ingroup or the outgroup, respectively, and b ∈ [0,1] is the strength of outgroup aversion, such that the lower bound of V is 1 -b. The functions F and V are visualized in Figure 3 . 
Initialization
The population consists of M patches, each with N agents, for a total of MN agents. We assume that there are equal numbers of each group identity in the population overall. However, patches themselves can vary in the proportions of members of each social group. The demographic skew, Q, is the maximum proportion of group A among the patches, so that the patch with the lowest frequency of group A members has frequency 1 − Q. For each patch j, such that j ∈ {1,...,M}, the frequency of group A members qj is given by
which simplifies to
Patch j therefore contains qiN members of group A and (1 -qi)N members of group B, both rounded to their nearest integer values. Note that when Q = 0.5, each patch has an equal number of members from each group. Q = 1 is the maximum skew, where each group has a single patch entirely devoid of outgroup individuals. For our initial simulations, we used Q = 0.9, and M = N = 49 (see Figure 1) . For most simulations, five early adopters were seeded in the most centrally located and heterogeneous patch (patch 25, the center patch), though we also experimented with seeding early adopters in a more far-flung, homogeneous patch (patch 1, the leftmost patch). All parameters and values used for our simulations are summarized in Table 1 . 
Metrics of adoption and polarization
Each model instantiation was run for 2,000 time steps, which was always long enough to reach an equilibrium in which adoption levels remained consistent. Aggregate data are averages from 100 runs for each set of parameter values. Our results are summarized using the total adoption level as well as local and global polarization metrics.
Adoption is simply the fraction of the total population that has adopted the innovation. Patch-level adoption levels were also recorded for each of the two social identity groups. Global polarization is a measure of the extent to which, at the level of the population, adoption is skewed toward one social identity group over the other. This was simply |n1 -n2|/(n1 + n2), where n1 and n2 are the number of agents in each group, respectively, who have adopted the innovation. This will be zero when each group has an equal number of adopters and one when all the adopters belong to one group.
Local polarization is simply the average patch-level polarization. This is equal to Σj |(n1j/N1j -n2j/N2j)|, where n1j and n2j are the number of A or group B adopters in patch j, and N1j and N2j are the total number of group A and group B individuals. This formulation allows us to control for inequalities in the number of agents from each group in each patch, so that a patch where everyone has adopted will have zero polarization regardless of the number of agents from each group. As a convenience, we let 0/0 = 0.
Simulation Results
Our agent-based model was implemented in both Java, using the MASON library (Luke et al. 2005) , and NetLogo (Wilensky 1999 ), each coded independently by different authors (PS and MJ, respectively) to ensure that results were not due to programming error. The results reported are performed with the Java version and the model code is made freely available on openabm.org 6 . Here we present the results of our simulation experiments, focusing on the five questions posed in the Introduction.
Outgroup aversion hinders adoption
We find that increasing the strength of outgroup aversion, b, hindered adoption (Figure 4a ). Stochastic events early on in the adoption process led one group to become associated with the innovation within any given patch, resulting in the outgroup becoming averse to adoption. Within a patch, the adopting group was highly likely to be the local majority, both because they were more likely to be the early adopters (all things being equal) and because majority group members were more likely to be observed by potential adopters. Stronger frequency dependence also resulted in lower rates of adoption as long as outgroup aversion was nonzero. In these cases, individuals were less likely to spontaneously adopt, creating a feedback loop resulting in persistent low adoption. Indeed, because outgroup aversion reduced the availability of ready adopters and impeded the spread of the innovation when rare, high values of λ under strong outgroup aversion sometimes meant the innovation failed entirely to spread (i.e., the adoption rate was zero at the end of the simulation), though this was also influenced by the initial location of early adopters as well as the degree of demographic skew ( Figure 5 ). 
Outgroup aversion increases local, but not global, polarization
Stronger outgroup aversion did not much influence the level of global polarization (Figure 4b ). Some global polarization did occasionally occur when frequency dependence was high, though this was due to low overall adoption rates and stochasticity in early adoption. We do note that the lack of global polarization is likely dependent on our strong assumption of equally represented social identity groups and symmetrical demographic skew. Future work should explore the effects of asymmetrically distributed social groups. That said, increased outgroup aversion reliably led to increased local polarization ( Figure 4c ): Within patches, one group tended either to have an initially higher rate of adoption (a first mover effect) or to be dominant in sheer numbers, so that the minority group of adopters will come to be biased against the product. The members of the local majority group were often, but not always, the primary adopters within a patch. 
Higher demographic skew increases adoption when interactions are local
The demographic skew, Q, determines how much some patches will be skewed toward one group over the other. Q = 0.5 indicates that every patch has 50% of its members from each group. The start patch (SP) is where the innovation is first adopted.
As noted, under moderately high frequency dependence, innovations spread more readily under high demographic skew and when the location of early adopters is centrally located in the network ( Figure 5 ). We also found that, regardless of the strength of frequency dependence, greater demographic skew generated higher overall rates of adoption ( Figure   6 ): in the long run, adopters in any given patch tended to be members of a single identity group, which created a stable scenario in which non-adopters were prevented from ever adopting due to outgroup aversion. In this case, a scenario where all patches have 50% of each group will have at most 50% adoption. In contrast, a world in which patches are skewed can yield greater overall adoption because within any patch a majority of individuals can be adopters. We note that once the innovation spread, the overall outcome was not affected by the location of early adopters.
All of the results presented so far have considered only short-range interactions, so that the innovation can spread only between neighboring patches. It is often the case that observation and availability of innovations occur through long-range interactions.
How does this affect the dynamics of adoption? Figure 6 . The global rate of adoption as a function of λ. Increased demographic skew increases rates of adoption. Adoption is unaffected by the start patch.
Long-range interactions, if sufficiently common, lead to global polarization
Before an agent decides whether to adopt or drop the innovation, it observes m other agents to get a sense of how prevalent the innovation is and who has already adopted it. The variable f represents the tendency for individuals to observe others within rather than outside their own patch. This could reflect travel patterns, perhaps, or the influence of direct communication via telephone or social media. Each of the m observed agents is chosen from within the focal agent's own patch (at random) with probability f.
Otherwise, the observed agent is chosen from an external patch. If observations are local, then those external patches are restricted to the focal patch's immediate neighbors.
Neighboring patches have correlated skews; that is, they have similar proportions of the two marked groups. If observations are random, then external patches are chosen randomly. These observations may be considered long-range; they result in a more wellmixed population structure in which individuals are influenced by others who might If observations are mostly made within one's own patch (f is large), then, as described above, patches will tend to be locally polarized with only one group adopting the innovation. However, the global population will not be similarly polarized. Rather, within each patch the majority group will usually control the adoption, though firstmover effects will sometimes allow the minority group to be the adopters (Figures 7a and   8a ). This is the case regardless of whether external observations are local or random.
If observations contain a large number of individuals from outside one's patch (f is small), then where those observed individuals are matters a lot. If observations are local, then one social group can initially adopt at much higher rates, as the innovation spreads in one direction but not the other. Eventually, though, the innovation will fail to spread among the group of the initial adopters when it hits patches in which that group is a minority. This gives the other group the opportunity to spread the innovation in patches where it is a majority (Figures 7b and 8b) . In this case, the population may initially be quite polarized (as one group is the primary adopter), but will quickly equilibrate. If, however, f is small and external observations are random (such that long-range observations are common), then this provides the opportunity for the entire population to become polarized, with only one group eventually adopting the innovation. Initially, when the innovation is rare overall, both groups will tend to adopt. As one group ends up with a slightly higher rate of adoption by chance, this initial disparity generates positive feedback, making it more likely that members of the same group will adopt and that outgroup individuals will not (Figures 7c and 8c) .
The absence of demographic skew increases global polarization
We found that the level of demographic skew, Q, influenced both the amount of polarization and the interaction with the rate of within-patch observation, f. As noted above, when patches are skewed and agents are averse to the outgroup, the population can sustain higher rates of adoption than when patches all have equal numbers of each group. When patches are skewed, the maximum adoption levels occur as long as the rate of long-range interactions is kept relatively low, either by having a large f for random observations or by restricting observations locally. However, when patches all have an equal number of agents from either group, the overall rate of adoption is unaffected by either the rate of external observations or whether external patches are located locally or randomly (Figure 9a ). The adoption rate is unaffected because within each patch, one group will dominate the adoption as long as some nonzero proportion of observations are made internally. The patches will be equally polarized (Figure 9c ) regardless of which group has the innovation. Figure 9b shows the conditions under which the population achieves global polarization (that is, when the innovation is adopted only by one group). When patches are highly skewed, there is a transition from complete polarization to (near) zero polarization as long-range interactions become rarer. When all patches have equal numbers of each group, there is almost always some degree of polarization, even when one group does not completely dominate. Polarization continues because within each patch, the group that achieves an early majority in adoption levels is determined entirely by stochastic events. Figure 10 shows the dynamics of a run in which observations are local and there is no demographic skew. Although the population structure does not favor either group to be the primary adopter globally, the nature of observations nevertheless facilitates significant polarization. 
Discussion
In this article we have constructed a model that takes population spatial structure into account to deepen our understanding of how product adoption as a social marker, and particularly outgroup aversion, affects the dynamics of innovation adoption. We find that an aversion to adopt products associated with an outgroup can decrease overall rates of adoption, leading to local polarization within network clusters or other communities. Efferson et al. 2008; DellaPosta et al. 2015) . This association can feed back into subsequent social behavior. If the adoption of markers, including consumer products, is seen as a signal of group identity, individuals might not adopt products that they associate with outgroups (Berger & Heath 2007; . Our model indicates that, at the population level, this can lead to widespread polarization in the adoption of products. A corollary consequence of that polarization is the decreased overall adoption of an otherwise universally valued product.
Our results further indicate that the increases in long-range communication facilitated by technologies such as text messaging and social networking sites should lead certain products and technologies to become globally associated with certain groups or affiliations. This polarization should interact with and be reinforced by psychological forces which lead individuals to grow increasingly similar to interaction partners whose views they already share, and increasingly different from those whose views they do not share (Lord et al. 1979; Miller et al. 1993) . Previous analysis of opinion dynamics in a network indicate that increased long-range interactions should foster increased polarization in network clusters, in part because individuals are more likely to be exposed to extreme versions of their original views (Flache & Macy 2011) . Such polarization might create new ingroup-outgroup distinctions, leading to further reductions in the adoption of innovations.
If more widespread adoption and the associated reduction of polarization are desirable goals, the role of social identity cannot be ignored. A pressing example is in the adoption of sustainable or environmentally "friendly" technologies. Firms, advertisers, and policy makers should make efforts to reduce the extent to which products are seen as social markers. One possibility is increased attention to research advanced by social psychologists on how to reduce ingroup bias and turn opponents into collaborators (e.g.
Sherif 1988
). Another option might be the introduction of competing but equivalent products to occupy the various niches created by different identity groups. Although the present analysis suggests that social identity salience should be avoided for maximal diffusion, this runs counter to the way many companies explicitly and successfully market their products, because in reality brands often compete for different submarkets. On the other hand, activists looking to decrease the market share of an environmentally costly product might seek to associate it with one clearly marked group to avoid adoption by another group.
The factors influencing innovation diffusion among competing brands are many, and analysis thereof in the context of identity signaling is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is perhaps helpful to speculate as to potential complications to diffusion dynamics arising from social identity. Consider competition between brands with cross-brand influence. Libai et al. (2009) modeled such a system and noted a rapid takeoff of the follower brand, which was countered by a persistent "interaction-based" advantage to the first entrant, in which its initial numeric advantage continuously fed back to generate more new adopters. They showed these effects could be observed in cellular service markets in Western Europe in the span between 1985-2005. Identity was not necessary to explain their results, a fact we find unsurprising. We should not expect social identity to be a significant factor in this setting, because cell service is not a visible product like a car, a smartphone, or an article of clothing. For products that can serve as a social marker, we expect the dynamics of adoption to be different. Exactly how group identity and social markers influence cross-brand adoption effects is not clear, but one assumption of cross-brand influence is that the prevalence of one brand increases the likelihood of adoption for the other brand. This effect could potentially be amplified in the case of identity signaling, because there would simultaneously be a reminder of the niche being filled by the product, and an incentive to avoid identification with the outgroup. In this case, the timing of a counter-identifying brand is expected to be even more critical than previously thought. On the other hand, the timing of brand introduction may matter less if the effect of identity signaling is very strong. We performed some simple analyses with an extension of our model, not presented here, in which two competing brands were introduced simultaneously. We found that, under some conditions, each brand could become fully associated with a different identity group, following an initial period of adoption and dis-adoption as the brands emerged as markers for each group. A third possibility is that the brands are viewed as categorically similar, and there is therefore cross-brand inhibition. A considered analysis of social identity in diffusion dynamics with competing brands is warranted, and will be the subject of future research from our group.
Our model presents a picture of innovation adoption that is necessarily limited.
Many factors other than social identity influence decisions to adopt a product, including the product's intrinsic quality and the consumers' current needs and available resources.
Multiple products can exist to fit similar niches, each of which may appeal to different identity demographics. Multiple groups exist, not just two. These factors are complex, hierarchical, and context dependent; certain group identities can become more or less salient depending on personal, social, and environmental circumstances (Roccas & Brewer 2002; Ashmore et al. 2004; Smaldino in press) . Moreover, identifying the network structure of communication-related product information can be tricky. Individuals are influenced by direct observation, word of mouth, advertising, and other media. Network position matters. For example, individuals with more network ties will tend to be the early adopters, and those with fewer network ties will be the later adopters (Valente 1996) . The availability of products and institutional support for their adoption may work in tandem with social identity to foster or impede support for a product. For example, identification as a political liberal or environmentalist might lead a person to become interested in adopting hybrid or electric vehicle technologies, but the feasibility of that adoption is highly dependent on the presence of local dealerships and the infrastructure of charging stations, which in turn may depend on government incentives (Wirasingha et al. 2008; Diamond 2009; San Román et al. 2011) . Nevertheless, the simplifications in our model allow an uncluttered examination of the role of social identity and emergent social markers in the dynamics of innovation adoption.
